In this article, we explore how characteristics of the domestic financial system influence the international allocation of consumption risk in a sample of OECD countries. Our results show that the extent of risk sharing achieved does not depend on the overall development of the domestic financial system per se. Rather, it depends on how the financial system is organized. Countries characterized by developed financial markets are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk, whereas the development of the banking sector contributes little to the international diversification of consumption risk.
INTRODUCTION
How do countries deal with macroeconomic risk? In principle, countries should be able to pool and diversify idiosyncratic risk internationally and thereby smooth consumption despite the occurrence of country-specific shocks. Although an extensive literature shows that the extent of consumption risk sharing between countries is relatively low (see e.g. Backus et al., 1992; Lewis, 1999; Obstfeld, 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) , the precise channels through which risk is shared are less clear.
In this article we study the role of domestic financial systems, by which we mean financial markets and banks, for the international sharing of consumption risk. The domestic financial system may be relevant for the international allocation of risk since it provides the necessary instruments to share risk across countries.
More specifically, countries with more developed financial systems are more likely to provide the appropriate instruments to share risk across borders. Thus, the overall development of the domestic financial system may determine the extent to which idiosyncratic risk can be diversified across countries. Nevertheless, financial systems may be rather heterogeneous in terms of the development of the individual sectors. That is, an overall highly developed financial system may be the result of a developed banking sector or sophisticated financial markets or both. If banks and financial markets are distinct channels for risk sharing then the degree of risk sharing achieved may in fact depend on the development of financial markets and banks, respectively, and not on the overall development of the domestic financial system per se. In this case, it also follows that the extent of risk sharing may depend on which element of the financial system is dominant. In market-based systems, financial markets are relatively more important than the banking sector, whereas the opposite is true in countries which are better described as bank-based financial systems. 1 Thus, risk sharing may vary across these types of financial system.
Against this background we explore empirically, using a panel data set of OECD countries, how the characteristics of the domestic financial system influence the extent to which countries are able to share country-specific risk internationally. Controlling for the overall extent of cross-border asset trade, we find that it is primarily the development of financial markets which helps to share risk across countries. Banks play only a limited role for international risk sharing, which may be due to a home bias in bank assets (see e.g. Vazquez and Gareia-Herrero, 2007) . Thus, we present robust evidence indicating that financial markets and banks do not act as close substitutes for the international sharing of consumption risk.
These results provide additional support for the view that risk sharing strongly depends on the extent to which risks are tradable. Hoffmann and Nitschka (2012) show that the securitization of mortgage debt contributes significantly to risk sharing by making risk associated with residential real estate tradable. Thus, it is not domestic credit per se that allows to share risks, but rather the extent to which risks are internationally tradable. While our analysis takes a somewhat broader view by analyzing the role of financial markets in general, the results do corroborate the idea that it is mainly the tradability of risk which helps to reduce the exposure to country-specific shocks.
Our analysis is closely related to the branch of the literature that studies the role of banks, and in particular the deregulation of the US banking sector, for risk sharing across US states. Demyanyk et al. (2007) show that the deregulation of the banking sector in the United States increased income smoothing. Shcherbakova-Stewen (2010) show that the increased access to bank credit, associated with the deregulation, improved interstate risk sharing during recessions, whereas the average extent of risk sharing remained fairly stable. This result is in line with the rather limited influence of banking sector development on risk sharing, averaged over the business cycle, which we detect using international data.
On a more general level, the literature on the influence of banking sector deregulation on interstate consumption risk sharing studies the removal of restrictions on banking activities within as well as across states and finds that both types of deregulation matter. Thus, the organization of the financial sector within states determinesto some extentthe degree to which risks are shared across states. In some sense, our results concerning the influence of characteristics of the domestic financial system provide an extension of these findings to the country level.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses why characteristics of the domestic financial system may determine the degree of risk sharing. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data set. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
THE DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND RISK SHARING
In this section, we discuss how characteristics of the domestic financial system may influence the extent to which country-specific risk is shared internationally. Basically, consumption risk can be diversified across countries via financial transactions. Consequently risk sharing should be closely related to cross-border financial flows. Nevertheless, at a somewhat deeper level, characteristics of the domestic financial system may ultimately determine how well countries can insure against idiosyncratic risk.
In general, it appears plausible that the instruments which are necessary to share risk efficiently are more readily available in financial systems which are characterized by a relatively high level of development. Thus, countries with developed financial systemsin a broad senseshould be less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Yet, the overall level of development does not take into account how the financial system is organized. In principle, agents can insure against country-specific risk by holding diversified portfolios consisting of assets which represent claims on a country's GDP. If such assets are traded on financial markets, risk essentially becomes tradable. Consequently, one would expect that countries with more developed financial markets are able to share risk to a greater extent, simply because risk is more tradable.
However, even if risk is not sufficiently tradable due to a lack of the appropriate instruments or if direct financial market participation is limited, international risk sharing may still occur indirectly through financial intermediaries. Consider for instance the case where a country is hit by idiosyncratic, macroeconomic shocks which lead to fluctuations in income. Although a substantial fraction of agents in the economy may not be able to smooth these shocks via cross-border financial transactions, they may be able to smooth consumption by either depositing funds at a bank or by borrowing from a bank. In other words, agents share risk intranationally with banks. 2 These, in turn, diversify risk across countries and thereby reallocate risk internationally. A similar point is emphasized by Demyanyk et al. (2007) and Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2010) for interstate risk sharing in the United States.
More generally, the international sharing of consumption risk may involve two stages. At the first stage, risk is pooled within countries and then, at the second stage, risk is diversified across countries. If risk is shifted from agents with limited access to international financial markets, for example, households, to agents who can more easily participate on international financial markets, as for instance banks, then the overall exposure to country-specific risk may decline. In this sense, financial intermediaries may act as a substitute for the tradability of risk. 3 2. Boot (2000) argues that banks increasingly provide risk sharing in a general sense, since the traditional banking business has been declining over time. 3. Note that in addition to financial intermediaries who diversify risk internationally on behalf of retail customers, financial markets may provide a similar type of intermediation via investments in multinational companies. Multinational companies typically acquire claims on the GDPs of foreign countries. Thus, an agent who invests in a multinational company essentially purchases a diversified portfolio of claims on foreign productive assets. Hence, in addition to ensuring that macroeconomic risk become tradable, financial markets also allow to shift risk to agents with a readier access to international financial markets.
In short, risk is either shared directly via asset trade, or indirectly via intermediaries such as banks. As long as banks and markets give rise to the same net foreign asset position, that is, if intermediaries just replicate the net foreign asset position that results from the direct trade of assets, the organization of the domestic financial system is largely irrelevant. In this case banks and markets are close substitutes for the international allocation of risk and therefore risk sharing depends only on the overall level of development of the domestic financial system. However, this need not be the case and therefore financial markets and banks may represent distinct channels of risk sharing.
So far, we have focused either on financial development in a broad sense, or on the development of individual sectors of the financial system. The extent of risk sharing may also depend on which element of the financial system is the most dominant, that is, whether a country is better characterized as a marketbased or as a bank-based financial system. Consider, for instance, two countries where financial markets are developed to a similar extent. Suppose that in one of the countries banks are relatively more important than markets in the sense that financial transactions are primarily conducted through banks, whereas in the other country, markets are relatively more important than banks. Clearly, if banks and financial markets represent distinct channels for risk sharing, then the countries may achieve different levels of risk sharing despite the fact that they both have financial markets with similar degrees of development. Put differently, the overall extent of risk sharing may vary across countries characterized by different types of financial system. Thus, whether banks and financial markets are indeed distinct channels for risk sharing and which type of financial system leads to a lower exposure to risk, are both empirical questions.
To sum up, the first issue we explore in the article is whether countries with more developed domestic financial systems are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Second, we analyze if countries characterized by more developed financial markets manage to diversify a larger fraction of their idiosyncratic risk. If macroeconomic risk cannot be traded to a sufficient extent, financial intermediaries can still facilitate international risk sharing. Therefore, the third issue we study is the role of banks for international risk sharing. And finally, we directly test which type of financial system, market-based or bank-based, provides more risk sharing.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA

Empirical strategy
To empirically evaluate the role of the domestic financial system for risk sharing we adopt the framework advocated in Asdruball et al. (1996) which has become the workhorse approach to measure risk sharing. The standard risk sharing regression is based on the benchmark of complete markets. Intuitively, under complete markets any idiosyncratic influences are diversified away and therefore consumption should only react to global factors which affect all countries. More specifically, if markets are complete and if preferences of the representative agent in each country are described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, then we should observe that consumption growth rates are equalized across countries (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Ch. 5 , for a detailed derivation): D log c it ¼ D log c jt , where c it and c jt denote real per capita consumption in countries i = 1,…,N and j = 1,…,N at time t.
Since this condition for an optimal allocation has to hold for any two countries i and j, it also has to hold between country i and the world average, and therefore: D log c it ¼ D log c t , where c t is a population weighted average of real per capita consumption growth rates. That is, under complete markets, consumption growth in each country should be equal to average growth.
If full risk sharing is not feasible due to incomplete markets, then consumption growth may depend on idiosyncratic variables, such as idiosyncratic output growth, D log y it À D log y t , where D log y it is the growth rate of per capita output in country i and D log y t is the average per capita output growth rate across countries:
The left-handside of the equation represents the deviation from the benchmark of perfect risk sharing which is linked to idiosyncratic output growth on the right-handside. If b = 0, then we have perfect risk sharing. In contrast, b = 1 corresponds to a complete lack of risk sharing, that is, the autarky allocation. More generally, Asdrubali et al. (1996) show that b can be interpreted as the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Put differently, b measures the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks which are not shared internationally. Similarly, 1 À b provides a measure of the extent of risk sharing. To empirically quantify the extent of risk sharing, Asdrubali et al. (1996) run a panel regression of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth:
where Dc it ¼ D log c it À D log c t and Dỹ it ¼ D log y it À D log y t , f i denote countryfixed effects and it is the remainder error term.
To explore how the domestic financial system influences the exposure to idiosyncratic shocks we allow b in equation (2) to depend on variables which proxy aspects of the financial system. More specifically, we parameterize b as
where F it denotes a proxy either for the overall development of the financial system, for the development of financial markets and banks or for the type of the financial system. Several studies find that risk sharing has increased over the last decades due to deeper financial integration (see e.g. Artis and Hoffmann, 2008b; Sørensen et al., 2007) . We include a time trend, Trend, to control for this increase in risk sharing in a general way. Note that we only consider lagged values of F it in equation (3). The reason is that the proxies for financial development are cyclical. Therefore, the estimated coefficients may pick up the effect of output growth on financial variables when the contemporaneous values of F it are included. In this case, the estimation results would not allow for an interpretation in terms of the effect of the financial system on risk sharing. The lagged values of F it are predetermined and therefore not driven by business cycle conditions in t. 4
Using the parameterization for b and equation (2) we obtain our estimating equation:
So we essentially add interaction terms to capture the influence of the domestic financial system on the dependence of country-specific consumption growth on country-specific output growth. 5 Thereby b 0 is the average exposure to idiosyncratic risk and b F measures the effect of F itÀ1 on the exposure.
Note that in addition to the interaction terms, we include the variables contained in F itÀ1 and also Trend directly in equation (4), that is not interacted with Dỹ it . Although the coefficients on these variables are not of direct interest for the analysis, their inclusion helps to avoid potential mis-specification. Throughout the article, we use a cluster-robust variance-covariance matrix of the error term it .
Data
Our analysis is based on annual data from 23 OECD countries and covers the period 1988-2004, since some of the financial system variable which we use in our analysis are not available for longer periods. 6 The precise sample varies somewhat depending on the availability of data for the individual countries. Real per capita consumption and real per capita GDP are taken from the Penn World Tables, described in Heston et al. (2006) , and are measured in constant international prices. World aggregates are calculated as weighted averages:
To obtain proxy variables for the characteristics of the domestic financial system we draw on the large literature studying finance and growth. Data on financial system indicators are provided by Demirgue-Kunt and Levine (2001). 7 Specifically, we follow Demirgue-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and use bank assets as a percentage of GDP as an indicator for the development of the banking sector (bank it ) and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP to proxy the development of financial markets (market it ) in general. Based on these two variables we construct two further indicators for the domestic financial system: The first is a proxy for the overall level of the financial system's development, denoted by dev it , which we calculate as dev it ¼ bank it þ market it . The second variable we construct, syst it , indicates the type of financial system which characterizes an economy. This variable is calculated as the size of financial markets relative to the size of the banking sector: syst it ¼ market it =bank it . We interpret countries characterized by high values of syst it as being relatively more marketbased economies. The set of financial variables, F it , thus consists of dev it , market it , bank it and syst it . These four variables are directly related to the four issues we explore in this study: If the overall level of development has a favorable impact on the degree of international risk sharing, dev it should enter significantly with a negative sign in equation (4) (i.e. b dev \ 0); If b market \ 0, then larger financial markets lead to a lower exposure to country-specific risk; Similarly, b bank \ 0 indicates that countries with a larger banking sector are less exposed to idiosyncratic income shocks. This result would be consistent with the interpretation that banks diversify risk internationally on behalf of agents who do not participate on financial markets directly; Finally if b syst \ 0, then we may conclude that market-based economies are able to share a larger fraction of risk than bank-based economies.
To control more directly for international diversification, we also construct the variable FA it , as the sum of a country's foreign assets and liabilities over GDP. This variable captures the idea that diversification is ultimately linked to two-way trade in assets (see Obstfeld, 2004) . Data on foreign assets and liabilities are obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and consist of foreign direct investment, equity and debt portfolio investment, and financial derivatives.
All variables, except Trend and dummy variables, are logged to cope with potential outliers in the data. Moreover, we subtract the means from the variables included in F it , from FA it , and also from Trend. Using de-meaned variables allows for a ready interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction terms. Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Baseline results
Column (I) in Table 3 shows the results for the standard risk sharing equation augmented with a time trend, but without the financial system variables. We see that the average exposure to idiosyncratic risk is about 65 %. Thus, countries are able to insure against approximately 35 % of idiosyncratic fluctuations in output. Moreover, the trend variable enters significantly with a negative sign, indicating a general increase in the degree of risk sharing over time. This result is in line with the existing literature (see e.g. Artis and Hoffmann, 2008b) .
The remaining columns of Table 3 show how dev itÀ1 , market itÀ1 , bank itÀ1 , and syst itÀ1 influence the exposure to idiosyncratic fluctuations in output. We see from column (II) that the interaction term involving dev itÀ1 enters with a negative sign. That is, high values of dev itÀ1 tend to reduce the impact of idiosyncratic output growth on consumption growth. However, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. Thus, column (II) provides only weak evidence in favor of the hypothesis that developed domestic financial systems result in more risk sharing.
Columns (III) and (IV) show how the development of financial markets and of banks influence risk sharing. In contrast to the overall financial development, we see from column (III) that countries with large financial markets are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. This result confirms our expectation that the higher tradability of risk associated with large and developed financial markets improves the Banks, Financial Markets and International Consumption Risk Sharing ability to share risk across countries. The effect of market itÀ1 is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful. From a substantive point of view our results suggest that an increase in stock market capitalization relative to GDP by 1SD (i.e. by 0.782; cf. Table 1) increases the degree of risk sharing by about 12 percentage points to 53 %. 8 Concerning the role of banks, column (IV) shows that bank itÀ1 does not significantly impact upon the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Thus, although large financial markets foster risk sharing, banks do not appear to provide international diversification of consumption risk. This conclusion is reinforced when we compare risk sharing across types of financial systems. Column (V) shows that higher values of syst itÀ1 significantly reduce the exposure to country-specific fluctuations in output growth. 9 That is, countries characterized by relatively more market-based systems are less exposed to risk. This result is consistent with the interpretation that the tradability of risk in market-based systems is essential for risk sharing. In column (VI) we include bank itÀ1 and market itÀ1 simultaneously. While the point estimates change somewhat, we still find that market itÀ1 improves risk sharing significantly, while bank itÀ1 appears to play only a limited role.
In short, what matters for risk sharing is not financial development per se, but the development of financial markets suggesting that is primarily the tradability Notes: The endogenous variable is Dc it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects and Trend as well as either dev itÀ1 , market itÀ1 , bank itÀ1 or syst itÀ1 as additional (not interacted) regressors; t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
9. Note, that in the specification in column (V), we do not control for the overall level of development. Since syst itÀ1 ignores the overall level of development, countries where the relative importance of banks and markets is similar are treated similarly in this specification, although these countries may still differ substantially with respect to their overall level of financial development. However, since our sample consists only of OECD countries with relatively developed, albeit heterogeneous, financial systems, this issue does not appear to be problematic. This interpretation is also supported by the insignificance of dev itÀ1 in column (I).
of risk which helps to share risk across countries. This result is in line with Hoffmann and Nitschka (2012) who find that increased tradability of risk due to securitization has improved international risk sharing. Banks, in contrast, do not appear to be a substitute for the tradability of risk. This finding is consistent with the empirically documented home bias in bank assets (see Vazquez and Garcia-Herrero, 2007) and also with the finding in Buch and DeLong (2004) that crossborder bank mergers can only be partly explained by diversification motives.
Robustness checks
While using lagged values of F it ensures that we do not pick up business cycle comovement of financial variables with output growth, equation (4) may still suffer from endogenity bias since the financial system variables may be endogenous if the dependent variable has a direct influence on the financial variables.
To cope with the potential endogeneity, we estimate equation (4) using the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure which relies on internal instruments. To avoid problems of instrument proliferation, which result in overfitting and a weakened Hansen overidentification test, we restrict the number of lags used as instruments to two and collapse, that is, horizontally squeeze, the instrument matrix (see Roodman, 2009 , for details). The results presented in Table 4 confirm our conclusions. Moreover, the statistical validity of the results is supported by the Hansen J-test and the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. 10 Since, the Arellano-Bond estimates closely resemble the fixedeffects results, we can rely on the fixed-effects estimator in the remainder of the article.
As further robustness checks, we re-estimate equation (4) either without the trend [see columns (Ia) to (IVa) in Table 5 ] or with per capita GDP instead of the trend [see columns (Ib) to (IVb)]. We see that our conclusions are robust with respect to these modifications. We also explore the cross-sectional stability of our estimates by conducting a country-jackknife analysis. Dropping individual countries from the sample has essentially no influence on the results. 11 Although the evidence provided so far is consistent with a dominant influence of financial development and structure on risk sharing, one might question our results with the argument that the proxies for the domestic financial system pick up too much short-run volatility to allow for a structural interpretation. For instance, stock market capitalization may be driven by price changes. That is, a relatively large stock market capitalization may not only be an indication for the development of financial markets, but may also show that stock prices have strongly increased. And since risk sharing may be higher in times of rising stock prices, we may simply pick up the effect of stock prices instead of structural aspects of the financial system. 10. For the specification including dev itÀ1 , the p-value associated with the Hansen J-test turns out to be below the value of 10 %, which is typically considered as a threshold. This result casts some doubts on the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Yet, increasing the number of lags used as instruments to three, increases the p-value above 10 % with almost no impact on the point estimates. 11. Detailed results are available upon request.
To meet this concern, we re-estimate equation (4) with categorical indicators for the various proxies of the domestic financial system. That is, we group countries according to the characteristics of their financial systems. More specifically, we create a set of dummy variables, D F i , where F is either dev, market, bank, or syst, which are equal to unity if the mean value of the respective financial indicator variable for country i is above the cross-country average. For example, D dev i is defined as Note that since the grouping of countries depends on averages taken over the entire sample period, we are much less likely to pick up any short run variation such as large movements in stock prices. In addition, the grouping based on long-run averages is also plausibly exogenous with respect to the business cycle. However, the period over which we take the averages is clearly somewhat arbitrary. It appears conceivable that the relative importance of banks and markets changes as financial systems evolve over time. To meet this concern, we allow countries to switch between bank-based and market-based systems by grouping countries based on a comparison of F it with the cross section average in every year. However, we find that the relative positions Notes: The endogenous variable is Dc it ; Specifications are estimated using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator; dev itÀ1 , market itÀ1 , bank itÀ1 or syst itÀ1 are instrumented using the first lag two lags; t-statistics based on one-step robust standard errors in parenthesis; AB(1) and AB(2) denote the Arellano-Bond test statistics for first-and second-order serial correlation; J denotes the Hansen J-test statistic (heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust); No. IVs is the number of instruments used; Estimations are carried out using Roodman (2006) . remain remarkably stable over time. 12 The only exceptions are Finland and Japan. Using yearly, cross-section averages indicates that these two countries switch their relative positions in 1997. In particular, Finland moves from the group of bank-based economies to the group of market-based countries and Japan vice versa. 13 To cope with this issue we explicitly allow these two countries to switch their positions in the year 1997. Specifically, D syst it ¼ 0 for t < 1997 and D syst it ¼ 1 for t ! 1997 for Finland and for Japan vice versa. In addition, we also consider an alternative grouping of the countries based on characteristics of their legal systems. La Porta et al. (1997) argue that the origin of the legal system, and in particular, the distinction between common and civil law traditions, determines to a large extent the structure and development of the financial system. The reason is that common law countries offer systematically better investor protection which fosters the development of financial markets. We define the dummy Again to account for a general increase in risk sharing over time, we allow b to depend on a time trend which may now exert a different effect on risk sharing across the groups of countries:
From Table 6 we see that our main conclusions remain unaltered. According to column (I), countries with a more developed financial system are slightly less exposed to idiosyncratic risk, although the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal (i.e. H 0 : b 1F ¼ b 2F ) cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, column (II) shows that countries with an above average stock market capitalization are exposed to about 55 % of the idiosyncratic variation in their outputs, whereas the exposure is about 75 % for countries with below average stock market capitalizations, although the null of equal risk sharing is only marginally rejected at the 11 % level. From column (III) we see that the exposure to idiosyncratic risk appears to be slightly lower in countries with large banking sectors. However, the null of equal coefficients is not rejected. column (IV) shows that countries characterized by a market-based financial system are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Column (V) displays the corresponding results when Finland and Japan are allowed to switch their positions; Finland moves from bank-based to market-based and Japan vice versa. Clearly, also in this case 12. Using the whole sample to group the countries, the market-based countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 13. The classification of Japan is generally not unambiguous since the Japanese financial system consists of large financial markets as well as an important banking sector (see also Allen et al., 2007) . 14. Common law countries are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. Data on the origin of the legal system are available at http://www.economics. harvard.edu/faculty/ shleifer/dataset. market-based economies achieve a significantly higher level of risk sharing. 15 Finally, column (VI) shows that countries with a common law tradition are significantly less exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. Since the majority of common law countries are also market-based countries, Column (VI) reinforces our results. Notes: The endogenous variable is Dc it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects as well as Trend as additional (not interacted) regressors; Trend F 1 is a group-specific trend for countries with an above cross-country average value of the financial variable or a common law tradition; Trend F 2 is a group-specific trend for countries with a below cross-country average value of the financial variable or a civil law tradition; t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
15. We also explore how our results change if these two countries are classified as bank-based instead of market-based. The estimation results are not affected by this re-classification. For the market-based economies, the estimated coefficient is 0.525 (t = 5.78) and for bank-based countries, we obtain 0.708 (t = 13.57). The p-value associated with the F-statistics for the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients is 0.08. Detailed results are available upon request.
International financial integration
We now explore the impact of the globalization and integration of financial markets on risk sharing in somewhat greater detail. In the estimations reported so far, we have included a time trend to take the impact of financial globalization into account. Although this approach allows for a substantial amount of flexibility, it captures variations in risk sharing over time in a general sense. In Table 7 we take into account that the process of European monetary integration may have had an effect on the ability of countries to diversify risks (see Artis and Hoffmann, 2008a) . To capture this potential effect, we include a dummy variable, D EMU it , which is defined as D EMU it ¼ 1 if country i is a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) at time t, and D EMU it ¼ 0 otherwise. Table 7 shows that while our main conclusions remain unchanged, EMU membership does not appear to play a special role for risk sharing since the effect turns out to be insignificant. 16 Thus, it appears that the general trend towards more risk sharing is similar in EMU and non-EMU countries.
Next, we replace Trend with our proxy for foreign asset trade, FA itÀ1 , in equation (4), which allows us to analyze the impact of financial globalization and integration more specifically. Since the domestic financial system and foreign asset trade are likely to be closely interrelated, this extension provides a more detailed picture of how the domestic financial system and international asset trade influence international consumption risk sharing. Table 8 shows that the degree of risk sharing achieved rises with an increase in total asset trade, since the coefficient on the interaction term Dỹ it Ã FA itÀ1 is negatively signed and significant at standard levels in column (I). Columns (III) and (V) again indicate higher values of market itÀ1 and syst itÀ1 reduce the exposure to shocks, while dev itÀ1 and bank itÀ1 [see columns (II) and (IV)] remain insignificant. However, when financial system variables are included, FA itÀ1 is significant only in the specification with bank itÀ1 . These results are again consistent with the interpretation that it is primarily the tradability of risk which helps to diversify risk across countries.
To explore the role of international integration and its interaction with the domestic financial system further, we split our sample into country-year observations with above and below median foreign asset position and re-estimate the specification for two different subsamples, instead of including FA itÀ1 as a regressor. We see from Table 9 that developed financial markets lead to a higher degree of risk sharing in both samples, that is, regardless of the degree of international integration. Yet, the effect is substantially stronger in case of an above median asset position. In contrast, banking sector development exerts only small effects on risk sharing in both subsamples.
While these results are suggestive of the dominant role of the domestic financial system for risk sharing, one has to keep in mind that financial development and foreign asset trade are closely interrelated in financially integrated economies. Hence, the information contained in the data may be insufficient to distinguish the effects of the domestic financial system on the one hand, from those of FA it , on the other hand. A way to cope with this issue is to orthogonalize FA it and the financial system variables by running the regression 17
where F it is either dev it , market it , bank it or syst it and use the estimated residualsû F it to replace F it in equation (4). Since the residuals are by construction orthogonal to FA it , we interpret these residuals as the extent of financial development or financial structure that is not related to foreign asset trade. Table 10 shows that our conclusions remain unchanged concerning the influence of financial market and banking sector development on risk sharing. However, FA itÀ1 has explanatory power only in the specification that includesû bank itÀ1 . Note that although this approach helps us to distinguish between the influence of the domestic financial system and the role of trade in foreign assets, we assign the common variation in FA it and F it to FA it . Consequently, the estimation results may overstate the role of international asset trade relative to the domestic financial system. Therefore, we also reverse the orthogonalization procedure and regress FA it on F it and use the estimated residuals of these regressions, u FA it , as a proxy for the extent of international diversification that is not related to the financial system variable under consideration. Ifû FA it enters significantly, we may conclude that foreign asset trade is an important channel for international risk sharing which operates independently from F it . Table 11 shows that dev itÀ1 , market itÀ1 , and syst itÀ1 significantly reduce the exposure to idiosyncratic output growth. Equally important, the interaction with bank itÀ1 remains insignificant [see column (III)]. Thus, even after assigning the common information contained in FA it and bank it to the latter variable, we still find that a large banking sector does not exert a significant effect on the degree of risk sharing. Countries with a large banking sector are still able to share risk via trade in foreign assets, but according to our results without the banking sector as an intermediary. Again, this result suggests that the banking sector plays only a limited role for the international sharing of consumption risk.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study we explore how characteristics of the domestic financial system determine the degree to which countries can diversify risk internationally. Although risk is shared via foreign asset trade it is ultimately the domestic financial system which drives the extent of risk sharing as the domestic financial system provides the means to trade risk across borders. In this sense, our analysis complements the literature which focuses on the role of international capital flows for international consumption risk sharing (see e.g. Imbs 2006; Imbs and Fratscher, 2007; Sorensen et al., 2007) . We find that the overall development of the financial system does not necessarily lead to a lower exposure to shocks. Only countries with developed financial markets are able to share a larger fraction of their idiosyncratic output risk internationally. Market-based financial systems tend to be less exposed to idiosyncratic shocks, whereas countries characterized by bank-based financial systems are more exposed. We also find that risk sharing via foreign asset holdings is largely independent of the banking sector. This result suggests that once countries open up and participate to a larger extent on international financial markets, market-based economies are likely to diversify a larger fraction of their idiosyncratic consumption risk internationally. It has to be pointed out, however, that although developed financial markets lead to relatively high risk sharing, the overall extent of risk sharing still remains limited. Thus, even as well as FA itÀ1 as additional (not interacted) regressors; t-statistics in parenthesis. Asû FA it is a generated regressor, bootstrapped standard errors are obtained using a non-parametric bootstrap over countries with 1000 replications. Notes: The endogenous variable is Dc it ; All specifications include country-fixed effects,û F itÀ1 and either dev itÀ1 , market itÀ1 , bank itÀ1 or syst itÀ1 as additional (not interacted) regressors; t-statistics in parenthesis. Asû F it is a generated regressor, bootstrapped standard errors are obtained using a non-parametric bootstrap over countries with 1000 replications. market-based countries with developed financial markets are still exposed to a substantial amount of idiosyncratic risk.
Also note that our results have implications for the ongoing process of financial integration of the euro area member states. While we find that risk sharing has improved over time, we find no significant difference between EMU and non-EMU countries. At first glance, this outcome may appear surprising as one would expect that EMU countries are particularly strongly integrated which should manifest itself in terms of increased consumption risk sharing. A potential explanation for this result is that the financial integration within EMU has not been accompanied by an increase in the extent to which risks are tradable.
Analyzing the relationship between the domestic financial system and international risk sharing using a more detailed characterization of financial systems appears to be an interesting direction for future research. Our classification of bank-based systems based on aggregate data is frequently used in the literature, but nevertheless somewhat coarse. Using micro data may provide more detailed comparisons of banking sectors across countries in terms of for example, fragmentation and competition.
Finally, we would like to point out that although the focus of this study is on the domestic financial system, the idea that structural or institutional aspects which are primarily related to domestic issues may also matter for the international allocation of consumption risk, may apply more generally. Analyzing such issues in the context of international risk sharing appears to be another interesting avenue for future research.
